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Abstract
This paper analyzes how institutions aimed at coordinating economic inter-
actions may appear. We build a model in which agents play a prisoners’
dilemma game in a hypothetical state of nature. Agents can delegate the
task of enforcing cooperation in interactions to one of them in exchange for a
proper compensation. Two basic commitment problems stand in the way of
institution formation. The first one is the individual commitment problem
that arises because an agent chosen to run the institution may prefer to re-
nege ex post. The second one is a “collective commitment” problem linked to
the lack of binding agreements on the fee that will be charged by the centre
once it is designated. This implies first that a potentially socially eﬃcient
institution may fail to arise because of the lack of individual incentives, and
second that even if it arises, excessive rent extraction by the institution may
imply a sub-optimal eﬃciency level, explaining the heterogeneity of observed
institutional arrangements. An institution is less likely to arise in small
groups with limited endowments, but also when the underlying commitment
problem is not too severe. Finally, we show that the threat of secession by
a subset of agents may endogenously solve part of the second commitment
problem.
Keywords: Institution, Coordination, State of nature, Secession.
JEL classification codes: C72, D02, O17, Z13.
“As for ‘philosophical history’, it involved accounting for the
development of beliefs, practices, theories, and institutions on
the basis of natural causes or principles, when actual records and
reports of witnesses were lacking.”
Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (1995).
1 Introduction
Since Adam Smith, the question of how diﬀerent types of institutions support
the eﬃciency of economic exchanges in varying social and historical environ-
ments has been a central one in social sciences. More recently, it has also
become a central theme in Economics, with the recognition that market and
non-market institutions are key in supporting and enhancing the growth po-
tential of economic interactions (Olson, 1965; North, 1990; Bardhan, 2005).
As Bardhan (2005) points out, to date the literature on the economic
analysis of social and political institutions have focused mainly on their role
as protectors of property rights. A more neglected role of institutions is to
correct the coordination failures or commitment problems that sometimes
plague the most basic type of economic interactions. These problems, that
can remain even if property rights are secure, are likely to be critical for
an economy at the initial stages of its development. As showed by Aoki et
al. (1997), the prominent role of the state in the East Asian development
process (through the intervention in the capital markets, the establishment
of technological standards or the use of contingent transfers), including the
economic transition of Japan after WWII (see Okazaki, 1997), demonstrates
that formal institutions can be crucial in economic development, not only
by protecting individual property rights, but also by inducing and enforcing
coordination when private mechanisms to do so are absent or underdeveloped.
Previous works on the role of institutions as coordination devices have
mainly explored two related lines of enquiry. First, they have analyzed in
great detail the internal functioning of specific institutional arrangements,
sometimes relating them to relevant game-theoretical mechanisms. Examples
are found in the economic history literature1 with Greif’s (1993) study of the
coalition supporting the interactions of Maghribi traders with their distant
agents in the 11th century, Milgrom, North and Weingast’s (1990) analysis
1See Greif (1997) for a survey of the economic history literature that relies on micro-
economic theory to study institutions.
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of merchant courts at the Champagne fairs of the 12th and 13th centuries; in
the development literature with for example the analysis of market institu-
tions in Africa in Fafchamps (2004) or in Asia by MacMillan and Woodruﬀ
(1999, 2000); and in the law literature with Lisa Bernstein’s (2001) account
of the private legal framework that rules the US cotton industry or Bernstein
(1992) and Richman (2006) accounts of private arrangements in the diamond
industry.
Second, a few economic contributions analyze how informal or person-
alized relationship-based institutions may coexist with more formal, anony-
mous mechanisms, and how the transition from one to the other may occur
(e.g. Kranton, 1996, and Dixit, 2004). This has also been an important
topic in social anthropology. For example, Ensminger (1992) describes the
century-long process through which changes in the environment finally trig-
gered the Orma tribe in Kenya to abandon their constitutional authority
from rule by a collective council of elders and to recognize the authority of
the modern Kenyan nation-state.
As most of these contributions describe institutions already in place, or
the transition between existing systems, very little has been said on the
environmental and individual factors that lead to the emergence, possibly at
varying levels of eﬃciency, of these institutional frameworks.
The aim of this paper is to model the process through which such insti-
tutions may or may not arise. Following our previous discussion, we see an
institution as a coordination device, a body in charge of enforcing agreements
or conventions that ultimately increase the eﬃciency of economic interactions
between agents. In the words of Greif (1997), it is a non-technological set of
constraints on behavior, which are self-enforcing. This self-enforcing nature
of institutions is modelled through a game agents play in an hypothetical
state of nature. Depending on the existing incentives, players’ actions will
eventually lead to the establishment of this coordinating mechanism as an
equilibrium of that game. Therefore, our analysis of the process of institu-
tion creation can be relevant to diﬀerent economic contexts, such as a tribe
developing formal trade exchanges2, a group of firms and clients in a given
industry, a country in transition to an industrialized economy, or even a set
countries faced with some international coordination issue.
2See Attali (2003) for examples of the introduction of witnesses or legimitator certifying
the validity of exchanges in early societies of Africa, aboriginal Australia or precolombian
Nicaragua among others.
2
Our point of departure is an economy in which the value of each indi-
vidual’s endowment is enhanced by interacting with others. Such payoﬀ-
enhancing relationships can arise in the context of a commercial exchange in
which specific endowments are transferred according to each agent’s needs, a
productive venture in which complementary skills are put together to create
additional value, or even intellectual or artistic exchanges.
In its simplest form, this is an informal economy: It lacks any institution
in charge of ensuring the eﬃciency of bilateral relationships. In this state
of nature, interactions take the form of a simple prisoners’ dilemma game.
Mutual cooperation would make it possible to attain objectives that are
beyond the reach of individual agents on their own, but being opportunistic
is a dominant strategy and in equilibrium very low payoﬀs are realized. This
is a source of ineﬃciency. Agents would like to find a way to coordinate at
the Pareto eﬃcient outcome and ensure that it is enforced in any bilateral
interaction.
In our model, agents can create an institution that will ensure mutual
cooperation and thus enhance the value of the bilateral relationships that
take place under its auspices. This body is akin to a judicial or political
mechanism in charge of the definition and enforcement of eﬃcient rules for
social interaction. More precisely, it can be thought of as a reduced form for
a set of norms, modes of behavior and beliefs of the types described in Greif
(1993) and Milgrom et al. (1990) for example.
For such formal institution to arise, agents need to delegate to one of them
the task of running it. But although formal interactions are more eﬃcient,
several problems stand in the way of institution formation. An institution
is costly to set up since the delegate must relinquish her ability to interact
with other agents, and must be properly compensated in exchange. There-
fore, our model endogenizes the rise of a ruler from a population of identical
individuals, in contrast with other works in the literature that exogenously
impose its existence (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2004) and compare
the scenarios with and without ruler (Grossman, 2002; Moselle and Polak,
2001). On the other hand, when the institution arises, agents have to decide
whether to abide by its norms of interaction or not; in other words, they must
decide whether to become formal or not; whenever two formal agents meet,
the institution can guarantee that the eﬃcient outcome will result. However,
in order to enjoy this right, agents must pay a fee that constitutes the source
of revenue for the institution.
We explore several procedures of institution formation and characterize
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under which circumstances they will be successful. We make special empha-
sis on the implications of these diﬀerent processes for eﬃciency and overall
welfare.
In a nutshell, we find that a decentralized process of institution formation
is plagued by two commitment problems. The first one is simply the indi-
vidual commitment problem that arises when the revenue that can be raised
by the agent chosen to act as the institutional centre is insuﬃcient, and she
prefers to renege ex post and fall back to informality, securing thereby a bet-
ter payoﬀ. Indeed, it is the potential rent associated with the eventuality of
becoming the center that motivates agents to participate in the process of
institution formation, so this rent has to be high enough to provide the right
individual incentives.
The second one, which we label “collective commitment” problem, is
linked to the fact that agents are not able to agree ex ante in an enforceable
way on the fee that will be charged by the centre once it is designated.
Both limitations on commitment have implications for eﬃciency. The
first aspect implies that an institution will not arise for some values of the
parameters, despite being potentially welfare enhancing. This is in particular
the case in intermediate size economies and when the extent of the coordina-
tion problem is rather limited. The intuition is that when the level of trust in
the state of nature is relatively high so cooperation is only a mild issue, the
outside option in which no institution emerges is more attractive, making it
more diﬃcult for the institution to arise.
The second aspect of lack of collective commitment implies that even
when an institution emerges, it may do so at a sub-optimal level of eﬃciency,
i.e. with an excessive level of the fee charged to agents in order to compensate
the central agent. This happens for low levels of trust in the state of nature,
because in that case a revenue-maximizing institution is able to set a high
fee compared to the first-best level.
Together, these two commitment problems generate serious ineﬃciencies
in the process of institution formation. We show that exogenously imposed
commitment along each one of these two dimensions alone would reduce the
scope for ineﬃciencies, but that the first-best institution emerges only when
both problems can be solved simultaneously.
We then examine several devices that may help to solve these commit-
ment problems endogenously. The first one is agents’ use of trigger strategies
to sustain cooperation in repeated interactions (e.g. Acemoglu, 2003). This
potentially solves the second type of ineﬃciency, by forcing the implemen-
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tation of a fee closer or equal to the first-best level. However, the question
of how such collective punishment strategy can be implemented in a state of
nature in which no coordination device exists remains open.
The second potential improvement, which again limits the ability of the
centre to charge a sub-optimal level of the fee, is the threat of secession by
a subset of agents. Precisely because our starting point is an institutionless
society, it is plausible to assume that no group within it will be satisfied if it
receives less than what it could get by forming its own mini society. To deter
blocking, the institution should thus charge a fee that cannot be improved
upon by any coalition. In that sense, the threat of secession may help to
alleviate the ineﬃciency linked to a too high fee. However, this eﬀect only
operates for a limited parameter space; a big population size and high levels
of trust in the state of nature make it very attractive to become a central
agent and therefore create too strong incentives to secede.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Next Section presents the model
and its basic elements. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium level of
formality, given that the institution has arisen, and the first best fee from
the viewpoint of a social planner. Section 4 explores diﬀerent procedures of
institution formation characterized by varying degrees of commitment and
of the freedom given to the participating agents. In Section 5 we analyze
the stability of these rules against coalitional deviations. Section 6 oﬀers a
discussion of the results and concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by N + 1 agents, who have an initial en-
dowment of value ω (representing a combination of skills, time and goods).
Agents’ interactions in this economy are described by the basic game G in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Basic game
Agents are randomly matched against one another and play G. Payoﬀs
in the matrix represent the return per unit of endowment invested in the
interaction. We assume that z > x > 0. The strategies C and NC denote
“cooperative” and “not cooperative” respectively. C stands for a cooperative
behavior that can create added value, and NC stands for a opportunistic
behavior that makes the agent take advantage of a cooperative partner but
yields zero returns if she is not.
The game G admits a unique Nash equilibrium, (NC,NC), that is Pareto
inferior to (C,C). This game is aimed at capturing the natural gains from co-
operation that exist in human interactions but also the possibility of distrust
and opportunism that lead to Pareto inferior outcomes.3
The scenario in which individuals are matched and play G without any
interference is assumed to be the status-quo of the economy. In order to
solve the problems of miscoordination, agents can set up an institution. It
will be in charge of enforcing the eﬃcient outcome in any interaction that
takes place under its auspices. This institution arises when agents delegate to
one of them, who we will call the center, the task of running it. The central
agent must relinquish her ability to interact with other agents but she will
be compensated in exchange. At this point, we deliberatively remain vague
about how this delegation process is carried through since the main body
of the paper (Section 4 below) amounts to discussing several procedures of
institution formation.
3In accordance with most of the literature on these topics, we have chosen this game as
the simplest way to illustrate the type of social situations we want to analyze. Admittedly,
there are many other games that may capture the trade-oﬀs we study here.
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If the institution arises, agents have to decide whether to abide to its
norms of interaction, that is to become formal, or not to do so and remain
informal. In the same spirit as Basu’s (2000) civic norms, we assume that
the institution is able to restrict the set of strategies agents can choose from
when interacting with other formal agents, thanks to the center acting as
a coordinating device.4 In that case, they play strategy C, ensuring that
the outcome of the interaction will be always (C,C). However, in order to
become formal, agents have to pay a fixed fee a ≤ ω, that can be understood
as an entry fee or a lump-sum tax that enables them to reward the center
for her activity and thus to interact under the institutional umbrella. Below
we will also discuss at length how the level of the fee a is fixed.
We will admit a richer description of the payoﬀ x in G and assume that
it depends on the eﬃciency of the institutional mechanism that in turn is a
function of the level of agents’ contribution a.5 Hence, the per-person unit
return from an interaction between two formal agents is
vFK,a = x (a) , (1)
where the superscript F denotes “Formal” and x(·) satisfies xa > 0 and
the standard Inada condition, lima→0 xa (a) = ∞, holds. One reason for
assuming that xa > 0 may be that the institution becomes more eﬃcient
when endowed with more resources, as it is able to invest more in physical or
relational supporting infrastructure, as in the case of diamond clubs described
in Richman (2006).
When at least one of the two interacting agents is informal, the institution
has no power to enforce the eﬃcient outcome and the game G is played with-
out any further restriction on the strategy space. Informal agents thus avoid
paying the fee but their interactions yield lower returns. Still, in this state
4Milgrom et al. (1990), Kandori (1992) and Greif (1993) among others, describe dif-
ferent ways in which such coordination can be achieved in repeated games, even if the
same players only meet occasionally. Such a mechanism is implicitly assumed here, but
we refrain to model it for tractability purposes because our focus is on how it emerges in
the first place.
5We could envision making x also a function of the proportion of agents KN contributing
to it. However, it is not clear theoretically how this will aﬀect x, so we abstract from this
complication. Indeed, a higher proportion could have a positive eﬀect because of network
externalities for example, but congestion could also lead to a negative eﬀect in a range of
parameters (see Kranton, 1996).
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of nature, agents may occasionally cooperate with each other despite the ab-
sence of material incentives to do so or of any formal institution enforcing
eﬃcient outcomes.6 Hence, we characterize the level of trust or cooperation
in the society under the state of nature by a parameter α < 1, which is an
initial condition of our economy and that may in turn depend upon culture,
expectations and the specific type of interactions considered. More specif-
ically, we assume that agents play the (C,C) outcome with probability α
and (NC,NC) otherwise.7 In that case, the per-person unit return from the
interaction between a formal and an informal agent or between two informal
agents is therefore
vIK,a = αx (a) , (2)
where the superscript I denotes “Informal”. We will assume that x(0) > 1
α
to
ensure that participating in a completely informal economy always dominates
the autarchic situation in which agents do not interact and simply consume
their endowments.
Given that agents are randomly matched and that they are assumed to
be risk neutral, the expected payoﬀ of a formal agent when K ≥ 2 agents
are formal is:
V FK,a =
K − 1
N − 1 (ω − a) v
F
K,a +
N −K
N − 1 (ω − a) v
I
K,a
=
K − 1
N − 1 (ω − a)x (a) +
N −K
N − 1 (ω − a)αx (a) . (3)
We assume that an institution becomes active if at least two agents are
formal, so the probability of formal exchanges is strictly positive.
Finally, the central agent, who gives up interacting with the rest of agents,
receives the fees paid by all formal agents. Hence, her payoﬀ is given by
6In fact, there is substantial experimental evidence showing that subjects are willing
to cooperate and trust others in prisoners’ dilemma-like settings much more often than
what the theory predicts. See for instance Marwell and Ames (1981) or Dawes and Thaler
(1988) among many others. This likelihood of cooperation is also often referred to as a
measure of “social capital” in theoretical contributions based on the prisoners’ dilemma
(Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). We return to this
interpretation in the final discussion.
7An alternative interpretation of the parameter α, in line with the literature on infor-
mality, is the level of free-riding that informal agents can make on formal institutions. See
for example Loayza (1995), Marcouiller and Young (1995), Choi and Thum (2002) and
Azuma and Grossman (2002).
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V CK,a = K(a− c),
where c is the enforcing cost she incurs for ensuring eﬃciency in each trans-
action undertaken under her auspices.8
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the game described above.
t=1
A delegation 
process occurs 
that determines 
who will run the 
institution.
t=2
If the institution has 
emerged, the fee a
to be paid by formal 
agents is set. If not, 
the status quo 
remains (informal 
exchanges)
t=3
Agents decide 
whether to 
become formal 
(pay the fee) or 
not.
t=4
Agents are 
randomly 
matched and 
play G. Payoffs 
are realized.
time
Figure 2: Timing of the game
We have thus constructed a game in four stages. In the first stage, that
we will make explicit in Section 4, agents set up the institution. Then,
the institutional fee a is set. In the third stage of the game, agents decide
whether to become formal or not. In the last stage, they are paired with
another interacting agent in society and play G, eventually resorting to the
institution set up earlier.
3 The equilibrium level of formality
3.1 Existence and Stability
Given this basic framework, the first question that arises concerns the ex-
istence and stability of diﬀerent configurations. Assume that K agents are
formal, N −K are informal, and that, without loss of generality, the N +1th
agent is devoted to institutional work. Given a fee a, this division of agents
between formality and informality can be supported in equilibrium if and
only if no agent is willing to deviate and change her status.
8Assuming that the cost is instead a proportion of the fee received does not change our
results.
9
A formal agent will not be willing to deviate and become informal as
long as V FK,a ≥ V IK−1,a = ωvIK−1,a. After some transformations, this can be
written:
a ≤ ω
µ
1− (N − 1)α
K − 1 + (N −K)α
¶
≡ a(K).
Similarly, an informal agents receives a payoﬀ:
V IK,a = ωv
I
K,a,
and will not wish to become formal as long as V IK,a ≥ V FK+1,a, which yields:
a ≥ ω
µ
1− (N − 1)α
K + (N −K − 1)α
¶
≡ a(K + 1).
Note first that 0 < a(K) < ω for allK > 1 and that given our assumption
above stating that the institution remains inactive if K = 1, a(1) = 0. In
any case, the equilibrium level of formality will clearly depend upon the
properties of a(·).
The next Proposition characterizes the conditions under which there ex-
ists a level of the institutional fee a that can support a certain amount of
formal agents as the equilibrium of the subgame in stage 3.
Proposition 1 a(·) is strictly increasing in K. Therefore, either N or 0
formal agents can be supported in equilibrium.
In this setting, only corner equilibria can arise, i.e. full formality or
full informality. Note that when no more than one agent becomes formal,
vF1,a = v
I
K−1,a = αx (0) for any a that the central agent might have set. When
full formality prevails, a(N) = ω (1− α). We will assume that c < ω (1− α) .
Otherwise even the highest fee compatible with full formality cannot cover
the running costs of the institution.
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibria that can arise in
this subgame for each possible level of the fee a.
Proposition 2 For a given level of the fee a ∈ [c,ω],
(i) Informality can be supported in equilibrium for all a ≥ 0.
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(ii) Full formality can be supported in equilibrium only if a ≤ a(N).
The proof follows from the arguments above. This Proposition shows that
a new coordination problem arises when the institution emerges. Paying a
fee compatible with full formality may not compensate the cost of becoming
formal when everybody else is informal. Hence, both full formality and in-
formality can be sustained in equilibria for the same level of the fee. Figure
3 depicts the profile of equilibria as a function of the fee a.9
0 a(N)
Only informalityMultiple equilibria: full 
formality or  informality
Formality sustainable
Informality sustainable
Figure 3: Profile of equilibria
3.2 The first best institutional fee
In the remainder of this Section, we characterize the optimum fee from the
viewpoint of a hypothetical utilitarian central planner willing to maximize
the total sum of agents’ utilities. Under full formality, the planner’s instru-
ment is the fee a that agents must pay in order to enjoy the benefits of
formal interactions. She will have to compare the maximum welfare attain-
able in this scenario with the (fixed) level of social welfare under complete
informality.
In the case of full formality, the constrained maximization problem of this
planner can be written as:
max
a
WF = N [(ω − a)x(a) + (a− c)] + ω
s.t. a ≤ a(N).
9For the range of fees [0, a(N)] there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
agents become formal with probability p(a) = α1−α
a
ω−a . Although this can in principle
support an intermediate level of formality, the revenue raised by the institution in this
equilibrium is maximized at a = a(N), and p(a(N) = 1. Hence, in this case full formality
would arise too.
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The above program yields a solution a∗:
ω − a∗
a∗
=
1
εa∗
µ
x(a∗)− 1
x(a∗)
¶
, (4)
where εa∗ is the elasticity of x with respect to a.
Since the fee set must not override agents’ incentives to remain formal,
a∗ cannot be higher than the maximum fee compatible with full formality.
Hence, the planner chooses to implement full formality with a fee equal to
aF = min{a∗, a(N)}.
This implies that the solution to the planner’s problem will be a corner
solution, i.e. a∗ ≥ a(N), as long as α ≥ α∗ where α∗ satisfies10
α∗ =
x(ω(1− α∗))− 1
ωxa(ω(1− α∗))
. (5)
As α increases, formal agents have stronger incentives to defect and this
must be compensated with a lower fee if full formality is to be maintained.
This decreases a(N) and the room for an interior solution shrinks. However,
the eﬀect of an increase in the endowment ω is ambiguous: It relaxes the
constraint but it also changes the objective function by making interactions
more profitable.
On the other hand, the planner can leave the economy in a state of full
informality. In that case, total welfare is just
W I = (N + 1)ωαx(0). (6)
Under full formality, social welfare is a function of the fee actually fixed.
There may exist values of the parameters for which even the maximum wel-
fare attainable under formality is below the welfare under informality. This
is characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Social welfare under informality is higher than under full
formality for any value of the fee a if
x(0) >
1
N + 1
(
1
α
+N
¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
αω
) ≡ x(N,ω,α). (7)
Moreover, the lower bound x(N,ω,α) is increasing in both the population size
N and agents’ initial endowment ω and decreasing in the status-quo level of
trust α.
10It is straightforward to show that such fixed point exists.
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Hence, for small and relatively poor economies (low N or ω) full formality
needs not be the most desirable outcome. Similarly, if under the status-quo,
the problems of miscoordination are not very severe (high α), setting an
institution may be too costly relative to the gains it can bring. In that case,
an utilitarian planner may prefer to implement informality.
Let us finally characterize as well the level of the fee that maximizes the
welfare of the set of interacting agents alone; it will prove to be useful in
Section 5. This fee solves
max
a
N (ω − a)x(a)
s.t. a ≤ a(N).
The above program yields a solution a∗∗ characterized by the first order
condition
ω − a∗∗
a∗∗
=
1
εa∗∗
. (8)
Therefore it is clear that a∗∗ < a∗. By the same token, there exist a threshold
α∗∗ such that the solution to this problem is interior whenever α ≥ α∗∗. It is
straightforward as well to show that α∗ < α∗∗.
4 Emergence of the institution
Since no central coordination device exists before the members of a soci-
ety actually create one, any eﬀort to set up an institution that will enforce
cooperation has to proceed in a decentralized way. In this Section, we ana-
lyze this process, highlighting in particular how commitment problems aﬀect
the eﬃciency of the emerging institution or block its emergence despite its
potentially welfare enhancing eﬀect.
We define a procedure of institution formation as a fair lottery over the set
of agents who freely participate in it for a given fee a. This lottery designates
the agent who subsequently will be in charge of running the institution. The
fee a can be set either before the lottery takes place or afterwards.
A lottery appears to be the simplest mechanism to choose the individual
in charge of the institution in the absence of an explicit coordination device.
A lottery is the simplest way to formalize a situation in which individuals
are all alike and hence there is no reason a priori why they should not be
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equally likely to end up in charge of the institution. A similar outcome for
instance would result from a bidding procedure, in which all agents would bid
for the right to become the center, and the winner would therefore be chosen
randomly among them.11 Also, considering that the basic interaction game
described above is repeated many times, a possible implementation would be
a scenario in which there is a rotation each period among members of society
to act as the center, or equivalently a new center is randomly drawn each
period.12
In this general framework, diﬀerent procedures of institution formation
are possible depending on the diﬀerent degrees of commitment available both
at the individual and at the collective level, the natural benchmark being a
fully decentralized process with no commitment whatsoever.
At the individual level, agents must decide simultaneously whether to
participate ex-ante or not in the lottery that will designate who will run the
institution. We assume that an agent who does not participate in the lottery
is subsequently excluded from the possibility of becoming formal. Hence,
given a level of the fee a, the institution can arise only if
1
N + 1
(N(a− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a)x(a) ≥ ωαx(a), (9)
where the left hand side shows the expected payoﬀ from participating, as
the sum of the center’s and the agents’ payoﬀs respectively weighted by
their corresponding probabilities, and the right hand side is the payoﬀ from
unilateral deviation. In equilibrium, it is easy to show that either all or no
agent will participate in the process.
All the diﬀerent processes of institution formation that we will discuss
impose this basic participation constraint. Still, agents who accept to par-
ticipate in the process may change their mind ex-post depending on the
outcome of the lottery. Therefore, when there is no commitment at the in-
dividual level, an ex-post participation constraint needs to be imposed as
well. This requires that agents should be given guarantees that once they
discover their role, they will not prefer to fall back into informality. As this
ex-post requirement is always satisfied for an agent who does not become the
11We will discuss this issue more in detail in Section 6.
12See also Morgan (2000) for an application of lotteries to reduce free-riding in public
good provision.
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center13, the relevant ex-post participation constraint, given a certain level
of the fee a, is
N(a− c) + ω ≥ ωαx(0). (10)
This defines a minimum level of the fee a ≡ ωαx(0)−1
N
+c, below which the
agent chosen to be the center would prefer to give up and the whole economy
would collapse to informality.
The benchmark assumption of no commitment implies that collective
choices are not possible and that the central agent has total freedom to set
the fee once she takes up her role. In that case, she will behave as a revenue
maximizing monopolist with no constraint on the fee to be set beyond her
own self-interest.
However, we will also contemplate the possibility of the fee a being chosen
collectively and that this choice may be binding. In this case, agents will set
a fee that maximizes total welfare behind the veil of ignorance, that is, before
the outcome of the lottery is realized.14
Table 1 summarizes the possible combinations of assumptions:
13It is obvious that (ω − a)x(a) ≥ ωαx(a) for any a not greater than the upper bound
on a, which is a(N) = ω(1− α).
14Admittedly there may be other processes. The ones considered here are polar cases.
15
4. Agents commit ex ante to 
participate in the lottery and not 
to renege ex post if chosen as the 
center. Furthermore, the center 
has no freedom to set a ex post.
3. Agents commit ex ante to 
participate in the lottery. If 
chosen as the center, they may 
renege, but have no freedom to 
set a if they accept to fulfill 
their role. 
Fee a set ex ante
2. Agents commit ex ante to 
participate in the lottery and not 
to renege ex post if chosen as the 
center.
1. Agents’ only commitment is 
to participate in the lottery ex 
ante. The center may refuse to 
cooperate ex post and is free to 
set a.
Center maximizes 
revenue (sets a) ex 
post
Strong commitment
(ex ante participation 
constraint)
Limited commitment
(ex post participation 
constraint)
Table 1: Assumptions on degree of commitment
Next we explore these diﬀerent scenarios, starting with the natural bench-
mark, the “No commitment” case.
4.1 No Commitment
Under the “No commitment” or fully decentralized procedure of institution
formation, the fee is freely set by the central agent. Moreover, in addition to
the ex-ante participation constraint, the ex-post one must be imposed. We
know from Section 3 that the maximum fee that the institution can charge is
a(N). Therefore, agents will participate only if the two following conditions
hold:
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)) ≥ ωαx(a(N)),
(11)
N(a(N)− c) + ω ≥ ωαx(0), (12)
16
which are simply the result of rewriting the ex ante lottery participation
constraint (9) and the ex post constraint of the center (10) by replacing a
with a(N). These two conditions are necessary for the institution to arise.
Note that when a = a(N), trading agents are indiﬀerent between formality
and informality. Therefore, (11) can be rewritten as:
N(a(N)− c) + ω ≥ ωαx(a(N)), (13)
from which it is evident that (11) is a stronger constraint15, so if it is not
satisfied, the economy will remain in a state of informality.
Finally, we need to establish which fee will be set by the institution in
equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria described in Proposition 2 com-
plicates matters because it translates in a multiplicity of fees that can be
supported in equilibrium. We will focus on the most natural equilibrium of
this game of institution formation.
Proposition 4 If condition (13) holds, there exists a SPE of the fully de-
centralized procedure of institution formation that implements full formality
under the fee a(N).
There are two possible sources of ineﬃciency in this scenario. On the one
hand, full formality is not implemented when (13) does not hold, despite the
fact that it may still be eﬃciency enhancing. This is the case when parame-
ters are such that the level of individual welfare obtained under formality
WFa(N) =
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)− c) + ω) + N
N + 1
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)),
dominates the level of welfare under full informality but is not high enough
to induce ex ante participation in the lottery.
Corollary 1 (Non-emergence of eﬃcient institutions) Under the fully
decentralized procedure, a potentially welfare enhancing institution does not
arise if and only if
ωαx(0) ≤WFa(N) ≤ ωαx(a(N)). (14)
15Of course, this is only true for a = a(N) and needs not be verified for lower values of
the fee.
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Such ineﬃciency may arise for economies of intermediate size and when
the status-quo level of trust α is suﬃciently high.
The lower bound in (14) determines when formality is more eﬃcient than
informality, whereas the upper bound establishes when formality is imple-
mentable. Within these bounds, the institution is welfare enhancing but it
does not emerge.
Corollary 1 shows that the first type of ineﬃciency is more likely to occur
in economies of intermediate size and with limited coordination problems
(high α). In the first place, it occurs if the size of the population is not small
enough for informality to be superior, but not big enough for the institution
to arise. The reason why N has to be large enough for the institution to arise
comes from the fact that the center’s expected revenue is increasing in N , so
there is a minimum population size above which the prospect of becoming
the center gives agents enough incentive to participate in the lottery.
On the other hand, the range of parameters for which a welfare enhancing
institution does not arise expands as α increases. At the heart of this result
is the fact that high status-quo trust makes the outside option of informal-
ity more attractive and undermines the dominant position of the revenue-
maximizing institution. This is an interesting result: We should observe
the emergence of formal institutions in societies plagued with coordination
problems and low levels of informal trust, while ineﬃciencies are more likely
to arise in societies with relatively high level of trust. The fact that inef-
ficiencies are less costly to agents implies that bearing the cost involved in
solving them is not incentive compatible at the individual level, despite being
socially eﬃcient.
Note also that the fact that the central agent is oﬀered the possibility
of maximizing revenue when setting a does not always suﬃce to ensure the
emergence of an eﬃcient institution. On the contrary, even if full formality
is implemented, the fee set by the central agent may be too high so the first
best cannot be attained. A necessary condition for this second type of inef-
ficiency is a low enough degree of trust in bilateral interactions, i.e. α < α∗,
that implies aF = a∗ < a(N) (see Section 3.2).
Corollary 2 (Implementable first best) When condition (13) holds, the
first best fee aF can be implemented in a SPE of the fully decentralized pro-
cedure of institution formation:
(i) For high enough levels of status quo-trust, i.e. α ≥ α∗.
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(ii) For relatively low levels of status-quo trust (i.e. α < α∗) if aF = a∗ ≥ a.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. When welfare is increasing
over the range of fees compatible with formality or when the level of status-
quo trust α is suﬃciently high, the planner would like to set the highest fee
compatible with full formality (i.e., aF = a(N)). In that case, the center’s
incentives are aligned with social welfare and the first best can be attained
by means of the decentralized procedure.
In case (ii), the multiplicity of equilibria described in Proposition 2 makes
it possible to support the first best in equilibrium. Here, full formality can
be supported in equilibrium for any fee a0 in the interval [a, a(N)] by agents’
use of trigger-like strategies of the following class:
F =
½
1 if a ≤ a0
0 otherwise
.
Then, the first best can be implemented when a0 = a∗. However, it is not
clear how in a state of nature that we define as completely noncooperative,
agents can coordinate in the use of these strategies, making it unlikely that
the first best be sustained when α < α∗. One context in which this could
be envisioned is when the implementation of an institutional mechanism is
supported by external advice, so such strategies can be exogenously suggested
to players. We will come back to this point below.
4.2 Partial Commitment
While the no commitment case appears to be the natural benchmark of
our economy, it is useful to consider how the outcome of the procedure of
institution formation varies when some degree of commitment is introduced
along each of the two dimensions considered above: Individual commitment
and a binding collective choice of the fee.
Of course, this raises the question of how such a commitment is secured
and enforced. We have some sort of a chicken-and-egg problem here: We
started in an institutionless world, where there was a basic problem of enforc-
ing coordination in bilateral relations. The possibility of commitment in the
present case would however indicate the existence of perhaps a multilateral
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mechanism capable of enforcing it.16 After showing briefly how commitment
may improve eﬃciency in the institution formation process under each of
the possible combinations of assumptions considered above, we discuss how
it may be enforced: In Section 5, we analyze in more detail a mechanism
that may endogenously support some degree of individual or collective com-
mitment despite full decentralization, namely the threat of secession by a
coalition of agents.
As mentioned, introducing commitment at the individual level amounts
to assume that agents do not renege ex post, whatever the outcome of the
lottery. Therefore, only agents’ ex-ante participation constraint (9) needs to
be satisfied (case 2 in Table 1). On the other hand, at the collective level,
commitment arises if the fee a is fixed by all participating agents before the
actual running of the lottery and this choice is binding (case 3). Finally,
combining the two yields the possibility of full commitment (case 4).
Case 2. First assume that agents are able to commit to set up the institution
if chosen, so the ex-post participation constraint (12) is dropped, but that
the center retains total freedom to set the fee. Therefore, only condition (11)
must hold. Since we know from case 1 that condition (11) is stronger than
(12), it is obvious that this does not introduce any change with respect to the
benchmark no-commitment case. This case shows that a stronger individual
commitment is only useful if accompanied by some degree of collective com-
mitment on the choice of the fee (see case 4 below).
Case 3. Consider now the case in which a binding choice of the fee a is made
by agents in advance to the lottery, but individual agents cannot commit ex-
ante not to renege ex-post in case they are chosen to run the institution.
Then, society will choose a fee that maximizes social welfare subject to the
ex post participation constraint, that is, a fee high enough to compensate the
central agent. This imposes that it is at least greater than a ≡ ωαx(0)−1
N
+ c.
Obviously, individual incentives must still be taken into account so the fee
chosen has to be compatible with full formality (hence below a(N)). Once
this holds, society will implement a fee as close as possible to the first best.
Proposition 5 The collective choice of the fee implements full formality if
16Greif (1993) shows how multilateral reputation mechanisms (where punishments are
inflicted by the whole community) can be cheaper and more eﬀective in enforcing mercan-
tile contracts than bilateral mechanisms.
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and only if a ≤ a(N). In that case, the fee set is a = max{a, aF} and the
first best is achieved if and only if a ≤ aF .
First, it is important to note that the collective choice of the fee makes the
implementation of the institution no easier than under the fully decentralized
procedure, as it still requires a ≤ a(N). However, this type of commitment
makes the institution more eﬃcient when implementable, because the first
best is now more likely. On the other hand, even if the first best cannot be
attained, i.e. a(N) > a ≥ a∗, there is an improvement with respect to the
same case under the fully decentralized procedure, since the fee chosen is a
instead of (the higher) a(N).
As mentioned, one way collective commitment to a fee could be imple-
mented at this point is through the use of trigger-like strategies. Note, how-
ever, that a repeated version of the game, with true (i.e. history-dependent)
strategies in which the center is in charge for various periods, would not
improve upon the one-shot version. The simple reason for this is that both
deviations and punishments would arise at the beginning of each period, so
the incentive constraint on the central agent in the repeated game would be
exactly the same as in the one-shot version.
Case 4. Finally, consider the case where there is no ex-post participation
constraint (strong commitment) and agents meet and agree in advance to
the lottery that they should implement the utilitarian first best.17 It is easy
to see that in this case the eﬃcient outcome is always implemented as stated
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 When both individual and collective commitment are possi-
ble, full formality is implemented if and only if informality does not maximize
welfare, i.e. x(0) ≤ x(N,ω,α). Moreover, the first-best is always attained.
The intuition is straightforward: When x(0) ≤ x(N,ω,α), the first best
fee aF is high enough to ensure that the ex-ante participation constraint
(9) is satisfied. Therefore, individual incentives do not stand in the way of
eﬃciency in this case and formality is implemented whenever it is eﬃcient.
To summarize, when considering the decentralized institution formation
process, the inability to constrain the center to chose a specific level of fee
17While in the no commitment case discussed in the previous section the ex-post partic-
ipation constraint was irrelevant as it was implied by the ex ante one, this may of course
not be the case when a < a(N).
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(lack of collective commitment) is a strong reason for the occurrence of ineﬃ-
ciencies (case 1). As this limit is relaxed, potential ineﬃciencies are reduced,
as shown by case 3. Moreover, when the ability to set fees ex-ante is combined
with individual commitment, the first best is always implementable.
The next Section discusses a decentralized mechanism through which col-
lective commitment may be enforced.
5 Secession
In this Section we consider the possibility that a coalition of agents secedes
from society to run their own institution. Our aim is to characterize under
which conditions a central institution will be secession-proof and to analyze
the impact of the threat of secession on welfare.
Since our starting point is the state of nature where no commitment
is possible, the concept of secession-proofness has a clear importance. An
institution can hardly be called self-enforcing if a group of agents operating
under it can improve its situation by withdrawing and later applying the
same procedure of institution formation used by the society as a whole.
Specifically, our analysis of secession will concentrate on the decentralized
procedure of institution formation, assuming that it will be employed both
by the whole population and subgroups intending to withdraw. Next we
analyze when the threat of secession can prevent the emergence of a single
institution and its eﬀect on eﬃciency.
Let us first state our definition of blocking:
Definition 1 Denote by aN the fee set by the institution. A coalition formed
by S interacting agents is a blocking coalition if and only if
(ω − aN)x(aN) <
1
S
(S(a(N)− c) + ω) + S − 1
S
(ω − a(N))x(a(N)). (15)
That is, our concept of blocking implies that no group of agents should
prefer (in expectation) to withdraw from society and apply among them the
fully decentralized procedure of institution formation. This is a relatively
strong requirement.18 Note that when a coalition contemplates the possibility
18Alternatively, we could have imposed a weaker criterion, as in Howe and Roemer
(1981), in which a coalition is blocking whenever it can guarantee a higher payoﬀ to its
members
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of secession, it recognizes that the fee that will be set in the hypothetical new
institution must be itself self-enforcing. We have in this case picked a(N),
the (sometimes unique) equilibrium fee we have at length considered in the
previous sections.19
Definition 2 A fee aN is said to be secession-proof if it does not spawn any
blocking coalition.
Secession-proof fees are natural focal points in the process of institution
formation: Members of no group should receive less than what they could
expect to obtain from creating a mini society under the same rules. Such fees
can thus be said to be in the core of that particular procedure of institution
formation.20
Given that we are analyzing the case of no commitment, we assume that
the central agent will set the maximum possible secession-proof fee. Secession
thus imposes new and natural constraints on the fee that the institutional
agent can charge. Notice that, if full formality is not implementable when
secession is not an option, this will continue to be the case when secession
is possible; since the revenue of the central agent cannot increase, secession
thus cannot help potentially welfare enhancing institutions to emerge.
The first question that arises is whether the set of secession-proof fees is
empty or not. It is easy to check that the payoﬀ of a coalition contemplating
the possibility of withdrawing is increasing in its size S. Therefore, for a fee
to be secession-proof it is enough to satisfy condition (15) for S = N. On the
other hand, the fee that maximizes agents’ welfare can be either a∗∗ or a(N).
Let us assume, for the sake of exposition, that min{a∗∗, a(N)} > a. Hence
the set of secession-proof fees is non-empty if and only if
1
N
((N − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω) + N − 1
N
αωx(a(N)) ≤
(ω −min{a∗∗, a(N)})x(min{a∗∗, a(N)})
If this condition is not met, we should reasonably expect the emergence
of more than one institution. When a(N) > a∗∗ this expression implicitly
19Note that for all S, a(N) = a(S) = ω(1− α), so we stick to the current notation for
simplicity.
20As any core-related concept, our definition of blocking only takes into account one-
step secessions. We do not consider the possibility of further blocking once a new society
is formed. The set of secession-proof fees defined here is thus minimal in this sense.
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defines a threshold on the population size, denoted by N0(α,ω) such that a
∗∗
is secession-proof whenever N ≤ N0(α,ω). Similarly, when, a(N) < a∗∗ the
threshold
N1(α,ω) ≡
αωx(a(N))− ω
a(N)− c + 1,
can be defined as the maximum population size that is compatible with a(N)
being secession-proof. Note that if N ≤ N1(α,ω) the threat of secession has
no bite.
The next Proposition summarizes the conditions in terms of the popula-
tion size N and the level of status-quo trust α under which secession is a real
possibility.
Proposition 7 The set of secession-proof fees is non-empty if and only if
N ≤
½
N0(α,ω) if α ≤ α∗∗
N1(α,ω) otherwise
.
Moreover, the threshold N0(α,ω) attains a minimum at α = α
∗(< α∗∗)
whereas N1(α,ω) is increasing in α.
The main reason for blocking in this model is thus the prospect of becom-
ing the center in the new mini society. When the size of the population is
suﬃciently big, the center obtains an extremely high payoﬀ and this creates
strong incentives to withdraw. As a matter of fact, notice that the condition
N > N1(α,ω) can be rewritten as
(N − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω > αωx(a(N)),
so a(N) stops being secession-proof whenever the central agent of the new
institution can obtain a higher payoﬀ than the rest of the agents.
Figure 4 depicts the regions characterized by this the threshold in the
parameter space.
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Figure 4: The set of Secession-proof fees
When the level of status-quo trust is suﬃciently small (i.e. α < α∗∗) and
the population size is intermediate (i.e. N ∈ (N1(α,ω), N0(α,ω)), it may
be still possible for the institution to avoid secession by increasing agents’
welfare via a reduced fee. In that case, secession can help to alleviate the
ineﬃciency produced by a too high fee compared to the case where secession
is not possible. But outside this case, secession is a real threat that can
render impossible the emergence of one institution comprising all agents in
society.
The natural question that now arises is whether the impossibility of a sin-
gle institution matters from an eﬃciency perspective. The answer of course
depends on the particular rules of secession and coalition formation to be
considered. Here we will assume that whatever this process is, any division
of the population in several smaller societies is stable only if all groups can
set a secession-proof fee.
Formally, a coalition structure is a division of the population into a col-
lection C = {C1, ..., CK} of disjoint coalitions of generic size Sk ≥ 3. It is
straightforward to extend our previous definition of secession-proof fees to
the case of subgroups: We will say that a coalition structure C is secession-
proof if all coalitions in it set a (possibly diﬀerent) fee that does not spawn
a blocking coalition within them. Here, we will concentrate on the case of
α ≥ α∗∗ for simplicity, meaning that in any secession-proof coalition struc-
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ture all groups must employ a(N) (because it is then the only self-enforcing
fee).
Next we show that if one considers secession-proof coalition structures as
the natural outcome of any process of coalition formation (or secession), the
impossibility of a single institution is negative from a social point of view.
Proposition 8: When α ≥ α∗∗, the total sum of payoﬀs under the single
institution is at least as big as under any secession-proof coalition structure.
As mentioned before, the incentives to secede come from agents’ prospect
of becoming the center of the new mini-society; recall that when the fee is
a(N) it is only the central agent who extracts positive rents. However, this
is socially wasteful because it leads to an unnecessary proliferation of insti-
tutions. Obviously, this conclusion makes abstraction from the possibility
that the coordination job of the center in smaller groups may entail lower
transaction costs, i.e. lower c in our model. If that is the case, the above
conclusion may require qualification.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have built a model in which agents from a population are randomly
matched to play a prisoners’ dilemma game. In the hypothetical state of
nature, such interactions are plagued by ineﬃciencies, as the only Nash equi-
librium is the configuration in which agents play non cooperatively, leading
to a Pareto inferior outcome. Formalizing an idea implicit in some of the
existing literature on institutions, we have assumed that agents can delegate
the task of enforcing cooperation in interactions to one of them (the insti-
tution) in exchange for a proper compensation. Examples of multilateral
mechanisms that can enforce such cooperation are found in many strands of
literature, including Economics, Sociology and Law.
The contribution of this paper is to focus on the process through which
such mechanism may actually emerge in a context in which no previous
coordination device exists. More specifically, our aim is to determine whether
this mechanism arises whenever it is potentially welfare enhancing, and when
it does, whether it is as eﬃcient as it could possibly be.
In a world in which no commitment is possible, i.e. individuals cannot
commit in advance to a future behavior, be it the participation in the insti-
tution or the level of the fee they would charge if chosen to be the center, it
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appears that the main motivation to participate in the process of institution
formation is the potential rent associated with being a revenue maximizing
center.
In this context, the model yields a clear answer to both questions above.
In the first place, there exists a region in the parameter space in which a
potentially welfare enhancing institution does not arise. This is because
individual and social incentives are not aligned, as to some extent each indi-
vidual fails to internalize the cost that he imposes on others by opting out
of a potential institutional arrangement.
Such an ineﬃciency is more likely for societies of intermediate size. Groups
that are too small are optimally left to the informal type of interaction. Al-
though this is not explicitly in the model, an additional intuitive reason
here is that within small enough groups, over time bilateral meeting between
two specific individuals are more frequent and coordination is therefore more
likely to rely on simple reciprocal trust; in the terms of our model, it may
be that N and α are inversely related. On the other hand, as the number of
individuals grows large enough, the rent associated with being in charge of
running the coordinating institution becomes large enough to ensure that it
will emerge.
Moreover, a welfare enhancing institution may fail to emerge if the gap
between the payoﬀ from non cooperation and cooperation is not very large,
that is, if what we called trust in the state of nature is high enough. Because
the outside option is not that bad, agents are more reluctant to engage in
a costly institutional process. This intuitive negative correlation between
institutions and the level of trust sheds light on one of the fundamental
identification problem that arises in the empirical literature on social capital
(see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2006). Indeed, it seems to be the case that when
formal institutions are weak, social capital (understood for example as trust
in our model) substitutes for them. When formal institutions grow stronger,
a process that often occurs along the path of development, some form of social
capital may be destroyed or become less important (see Routledge and von
Amsberg, 2003, for theoretical examples of such eﬀects). We may therefore
observe a negative correlation between measures of trust for example and
social or economic outcomes, but rather than reflecting some causal link, it
is the result of a fundamental endogenous link between social capital and
more formal institutional forms, of the type uncovered in our model.
Second, our model makes a step towards understanding the observed
heterogeneity of institutions. Indeed, even when the institution emerges, the
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commitment problem mentioned above implies that it may arise at various
level of eﬃciency, and in particular that it may be suboptimal, in the sense
that it will charge a fee that is above the welfare maximizing level. Again,
this is because of the absence of a collective commitment device to set the
institutional fee in advance, which allows the chosen center to adopt a revenue
maximizing strategy.
However, contrary to the previous one, this type of ineﬃciency is more
likely to happen for low levels of trust, i.e. when the gap between non coop-
erative and cooperative payoﬀs is large. So diﬀerent societies face diﬀerent
potential problems. When trust is low, a welfare enhancing institution is
likely to arise but will probably be too extractive in nature. In a sense, this
is the price to pay for coordination to be enforced in a context in which the
loss from non cooperation is large. On the other hand, when trust is high,
an institution may not arise, but if it does, it is more likely to be eﬃcient.
Indeed, because the gain from formal coordination are relatively low in that
case, an institution that would be too extractive is unlikely to be individually
incentive compatible in the first place.
We then show that the two types of ineﬃciencies stem from the lack
of individual and collective commitment. However, there is a fundamental
asymmetry here, in the sense that individual commitment to remain inside
the institution even if not chosen to be the center would not change the results
above if not accompanied by some degree of collective commitment to the
fee that will be charged ex post. On the other hand, collective commitment
goes some way towards solving the second type of ineﬃciency, the excessive
level of rent extraction, and if accompanied by individual commitment to
participate whatever the ex post assignment of roles, it does restore the first
best.
The question of course is how commitment may arise endogenously in a
world in which no coordination device or authority exist ex ante. We show
that the threat of secession by subgroups of agents may generate such col-
lective commitment, at least when the level of trust is low enough and the
number of agents not too large. On the other hand, as this number becomes
large enough, secession becomes unavoidable, resulting in a multi-institution
world. In the basic version of our model, this always reduces welfare com-
pared to a unique central institution. However, we indicate that transaction
cost considerations may introduce a trade-oﬀ here, if for example coordina-
tion in smaller groups is characterized by lower such costs. Endogenizing
these transaction costs is an interesting area for future research and would
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make it possible to better understand situations characterized by multiple
institutional layers.
Finally, the reader may argue that we assuming identical agents is at
odds with reality. |First, because we were interested in other, mainly envi-
ronmental, factors that may hinder or foster the emergence of institutions,
abstracting from exogenously imposed individual heterogeneity allowed to
better identify the eﬀect of such factors. Moreover, this heterogeneity can
be self-explanatory of the individual diﬀerences that we observe once institu-
tions have arisen. Instead of assuming them for a start, we have analyzed here
how the process of institution formation actually creates these diﬀerences. It
is clear, however, that individual heterogeneity represents an interesting av-
enue for further research and in the future we intend to explore the impact
of endowment inequality on the results of the present paper. This may have
interesting implications, in particular in the field of development economics.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since a(K) is increasing in K, only corner
configurations can prevail, in the sense that no intermediate number of formal
agents 0 < K < N can be supported as an equilibrium of this stage game.
Suppose that a ≤ a(K) so no formal agents wants to deviate. Then, since we
also have a < a(K + 1), informal agents would deviate and become formal,
leading to full formality. Similarly, if a ≥ a(K + 1), which is the necessary
condition to sustain N − K informal agents, formal agents would have an
incentive to defect to informality, leading to an equilibrium with only informal
agents.
Proof of Proposition 3. The condition (7) comes from just comparing
the welfare under full formality with expression (6). On the other hand
∂x(N,ω,α)
∂N
=
1
(N + 1)2
Ã¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
αω
− 1
α
!
,
where we make use of the fact that, regardless of whether the solution is
interior or not, aF does not depend on N . It can be shown that ∂x(N,ω,α)
∂N
> 0.
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On the other hand,
∂x(N,ω,α)
∂ω
=
N
N + 1
aF (x(aF )− 1) + c
αω2
+
N
N + 1
1
αω
∂aF
∂ω
(−x(aF ) +
¡
ω − aF
¢
xa(a
F ) + 1).
Note first that the expression in brackets in the second term is the FOC
of the planner’s problem and hence it is nonnegative. Second, if aF = a(N),
∂aF
∂ω
= 1−α > 0 and then is clear that the lower bound x(N,ω,α) is increasing
in ω. On the other hand, when aF = a∗ the bracketed term is equal to zero
since the FOC of the planner’s problem is binding.
Finally,
∂x(N,ω,α)
∂α
=
1
N + 1
(− 1
α2
−N
¡
ω − aF
¢
x(aF ) + aF − c
α2ω
+
N
N + 1
1
αω
∂aF
∂α
(−x(aF ) +
¡
ω − aF
¢
xa(a
F ) + 1).
Again, when aF = a(N) then ∂a
F
∂α
= −ω > 0 and x(N,ω,α) is decreasing
in α and; when aF = a∗ the second term is equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the center sets any fee not greater than a(N),
all agents will be formal. Hence, a revenue maximizer center will choose
a(N). When (11) holds, this ensures the emergence of the institution.
To address the potential multiplicity of equilibria, consider the following
strategy on the side of agents:
F =
½
1 if a = a0
0 otherwise
It is clear that this strategy can be supported in equilibrium whenever
a0 ≤ a(N). If condition (11) holds, full formality can be supported if agents
use this strategy for a0 = a(N).
Proof of Corollary 1. The comparative statics on N can be derived
by noting that WFa(N) is increasing in N , while the upper and lower lim-
its do not depend on N (since a(N) = ω(1 − α)). Rewriting WFa(N) =
N
N+1
[a(N)− c) + (ω − a(N)) x(a(N))] + ω
N+1
, the derivative with respect to
N is given by
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∂WFa(N)
∂N
=
ω (αx (a (N))− α)− c
(N + 1)2
,
which is positive since by assumption ω(1− α) > c and αx (a (N)) > 1.
On the other hand, the eﬀects of the level of status-quo trust α can be
estimated in the following way. Diﬀerentiating
WFa(N) =
N
N + 1
[ω − c+ αω [x(ω(1− α))− 1]] + ω
N + 1
,
with respect to α, we get that
∂WFa(N)
∂α
=
N
N + 1
ω [x (ω(1− α))− 1− αωx0 (ω(1− α))] ,
while the derivative of the upper bound is given by:
∂ [ωαx(a(N))]
∂α
= ω [x (ω(1− α))− αωx0 (ω(1− α))] .
Since ∂[ωαx(a(N))]
∂α
>
∂WF
a(N)
∂α
, and WFa(N) > ωαx(a(N)) for α close to 0 (the
right hand side then tends to 0), we deduce that there is a threshold value α
such that formality is only implemented through the decentralized procedure
if α < α. Note that depending on the value of the parameters, it might be
the case that α > 1, so no ineﬃciency arises.
Proof of Proposition 7. Recall from our discussion in Section 3 that there
existed a value of the status quo trust denoted by α∗∗ such that a∗∗ ≥ a(N)
whenever α ≥ α∗∗. In that case, min{a∗∗, a(N)} = a∗∗ and the threshold
N0(α,ω) applies. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂N0(α,ω)
∂α
= N(N − 1)ω1− x(a(N)) + αωxa(a(N))
α(ωx(a(N))− ω − c) .
Note that the denominator is the FOC of the utilitarian planner problem.
We know that when α < α∗ then a(N) < a∗, and the numerator is negative
(positive otherwise).
Similarly, for α > α∗∗, N1(α,ω) becomes the relevant threshold and
∂N1(α,ω)
∂α
= ω
x(a(N))(ω − c)− αωxa(a(N))(a(N)− c)− ω
(a(N)− c)2 .
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Since in this case, a(N) < a∗∗, then x(a(N)) > αωxa(a(N)) so the de-
nominator has a positive sign. Note as well, that this derivative evaluated
at α = 0 is positive, and that the denominator is decreasing in α. Hence,
N1(α,ω) is everywhere increasing in α.
Proof of Proposition 8. When C is secession-proof the total sum of
payoﬀs is simply
WFC =
KX
k=1
[(Sk − 1)(a(N)− c) + ω + (Sk − 1)αωx(a(N))]
= (N + 1−K)(a(N)− c+ αωx(a(N))) +Kω.
This expression is clearly decreasing in K, the number of coalitions in
C. Therefore, the total sum of payoﬀs under any secession-proof coalition
structure can never be greater than under the single institution (they are
equal if the single institution is secession-proof itself).
35
